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Abstract
In recent years the question of whether adding the limited principle of omni-
science, LPO, to constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, CZF, increases
its strength has arisen several times. As the addition of excluded middle for
atomic formulae to CZF results in a rather strong theory, i.e. much stronger
than classical Zermelo set theory, it is not obvious that its augmentation by
LPO would be proof-theoretically benign. The purpose of this paper is to
show that CZF+RDC+LPO has indeed the same strength as CZF, where
RDC stands for relativized dependent choice. In particular, these theories
prove the same Π02 theorems of arithmetic.
Key words: Constructive set theory, limited principle of omniscience, bar
induction, proof-theoretic strength
2000 MSC: Primary: 03F50, 03F25, Secondary: 03D65, 03B15
1. Introduction
Constructive Set Theory was introduced by John Myhill in a seminal
paper [12], where a specific axiom system CST was introduced. Through
developing constructive set theory he wanted to isolate the principles un-
derlying Bishop’s conception of what sets and functions are, and he wanted
“these principles to be such as to make the process of formalization com-
pletely trivial, as it is in the classical case” ([12], p. 347). Myhill’s CST was
subsequently modified by Aczel and the resulting theory was called Con-
structive Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, CZF (cf. [1, 2, 3]). A hallmark of
this theory is that it possesses a type-theoretic interpretation (cf. [1, 3]).
Specifically, CZF has a scheme called Subset Collection Axiom (which is a
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generalization of Myhill’s Exponentiation Axiom) whose formalization was
directly inspired by the type-theoretic interpretation.
Certain basic principles of classical mathematics are taboo for the con-
structive mathematician. Bishop called them principles of omniscience. The
limited principle of omniscience, LPO, is an instance of the law of excluded
middle which usually serves as a line of demarcation, separating “construc-
tive” from “non-constructive” theories. Over the last few years the question
of whether adding LPO to constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory increases
its strength has arisen several times. As the addition of excluded middle for
atomic formulae to CZF results in a rather strong theory, i.e. much stronger
than classical Zermelo set theory, it is not obvious that its augmentation
by LPO would be proof-theoretically benign.1 The purpose of this paper is
to show that CZF + RDC + LPO has indeed the same strength as CZF,
where RDC stands for relativized dependent choice. In particular, these
theories prove the same Π02 theorems of arithmetic. The main tool will be a
realizability model for CZF + RDC + LPO that is based on recursion in a
type-2 object. This realizability interpretation is shown to be formalizable
in the classical theory of bar induction, BI, which is known to have the same
strength as CZF (for details see Theorem 2.2).
To begin with we recall some principles of omniscience. Let 2N be Cantor
space, i.e. the set of all functions from the naturals into {0, 1}.
Definition 1.1. Limited Principle of Omniscience (LPO):
∀f ∈ 2N [∃n f(n) = 1 ∨ ∀n f(n) = 0].
Lesser Limited Principle of Omniscience (LLPO):
∀f ∈ 2N (∀n,m[f(n) = f(m) = 1→ n = m]
→ [∀n f(2n) = 0 ∨ ∀n f(2n+ 1) = 0]).
LPO is incompatible with both Brouwerian mathematics and Russian
constructivism. With LLPO the story is more complicated as it is by and
large compatible with Russian constructivism, namely with Markov’s princi-
ple and the form of Church thesis saying that every function from naturals
to naturals is computable (recursive) even on the basis of full intuitionistic
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (see [5, Lemmata 6.1, 6.5, 9.2]).
1One referee of this paper pointed out that Friedman considered semi-constructive
systems of analysis with LPO in [7].
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2. The theory BI
In the presentation of subsystems of second order arithmetic we follow
[18]. It is perhaps worth pointing out that the underlying logic of all of these
theories is classical logic. By L2 we denote the language of these theories.
ACA0 denotes the theory of arithmetical comprehension.
Definition 2.1. For a 2-place relation ≺ and an arbitrary formula F (a) of
L2 we define
Prog(≺, F ) := ∀x[∀y(y ≺ x→ F (y))→ F (x)] (progressiveness)
TI(≺, F ) := Prog(≺, F )→ ∀xF (x) (transfinite induction)
WF(≺) := ∀XTI(≺, X) :=
∀X(∀x[∀y(y ≺ x → y ∈ X) → x ∈ X] → ∀x[x ∈ X]) (well-
foundedness).
Let F be any collection of formulae of L2. For a 2-place relation ≺ we will
write ≺∈ F , if ≺ is defined by a formula Q(x, y) of F via x ≺ y := Q(x, y).
The bar induction scheme is the collection of all formulæ of the form
WF(≺)→ TI(≺, F ),
where ≺ is an arithmetical relation (set parameters allowed) and F is an
arbitrary formula of L2.
The theory ACA0 + bar induction will be denoted by BI. In Simpson’s
book bar induction is called “unlimited transfinite induction” and in it our
theory BI corresponds to the one referred to by the acronym Π1∞-TI0 (cf.
[18, §VII.2]).
Theorem 2.2. The following theories have the same proof-theoretic strength:
(i) BI
(ii) CZF
(iii) The theory ID1 of (non-iterated) arithmetical inductive definitions.
Proof. Kreisel obtained in [11] a proof-theoretic reduction of BI to a
subtheory of ID1 based on intuitionistic logic (notated as ID
i
1(O)), using
rather complicated and round-about arguments. By work of Gerber [8] and
Howard [10], the ordinal of IDi1(O) was determined to be an ordinal that
is now known as the Bachmann-Howard ordinal. As this ordinal provides a
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lower bound for the ordinal of BI, the proof-theoretic equivalence of BI and
ID1 follows. A more recent ordinal analysis of BI can be found in [4] and
[17, Theorem 10.2]. A direct syntactic translation of ID1 into BI will be
given in Lemma 3.2. The proof-theoretic equivalence of ID1 with CZF (and
thus with BI) follows from [13, Theorem 4.14]. uunionsq
There is an interesting other way of characterizing BI which uses the
notion of a countable coded ω-model.
Definition 2.3. Let T be a theory in the language of second order arithmetic,
L2. A countable coded ω-model of T is a set W ⊆ N, viewed as encoding the
L2-model
M = (N,S,+, ·, 0, 1, <)
with S = {(W )n | n ∈ N} such that M |= T (where (W )n = {m | 〈n,m〉 ∈
W}; 〈 , 〉 some coding function).
This definition can be made in RCA0 (see [18], Definition VII.2.1).
We write X ∈ W if ∃n X = (W )n.
Theorem 2.4. BI proves ω-model reflection, i.e., for every formula F ( ~X )
with all free second order ~X = X1, . . . , Xn variables exhibited, BI proves
F ( ~X ) → ∃M[M cc ω-model of ACA0 ∧ ~X ∈M ∧ M |= F ( ~X )]
where “cc” stands for “countable coded”.
Proof. [18, Lemma VIII.5.2]. uunionsq
It easy to show that the scheme of ω-model reflection implies bar induc-
tion (see [18, Lemma VIII.5.3]) and hence the theories BI and ACA0 +
ω-model reflection are equivalent, that is, they prove the same formulae (see
[18, Theorem VIII.5.4]).
Definition 2.5. The scheme of Σ11-AC is the collection of all formulae
∀x∃X F (x,X)→ ∃Y ∀xF (x, (Y )x)
with F (x,X) of complexity Σ11.
Corollary 2.6. (i) BI proves Σ11-AC and ∆
1
1-comprehension.
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(ii) BI proves that for every set X there exists a countable coded ω-model
of ACA0 + Σ
1
1-AC containing X.
Proof. (i) We argue in BI. Suppose ∀x∃X F (x,X, ~U ). Owing to Theo-
rem 2.4 there exists a countable coded ω-model M = (N,S,+, ·, 0, 1, <) with
~U ∈M and
M |= ∀x ∃X F (x,X, ~U ).
Let S = {(W )n | n ∈ N}. Define f(n) = m if M |= F (n, (W )m, ~U ) and for
all k < m M |= ¬F (n, (W )k, ~U ). Put
Y := {〈n, x〉 | x ∈ (W )f(n)}.
We then have M |= F (n, (Y )n, ~U ) for all n. Since F is Σ11 it follows that
F (n, (Y )n, ~U ) holds for all n. This shows Σ
1
1-AC.
(ii) To show that for any set X there is a countable coded ω-model of
Σ11-AC containing X firstly note that ACA0 + Σ
1
1-AC is finitely axiomatiz-
able, say via a sentence G. By (i) we know that G holds in our background
theory. Now apply Theorem 2.4 to find a countable coded ω-model that
reflects G and contains X.
Finally notice that ∆11-comprehension is a consequence of Σ
1
1-AC. uunionsq
The next result was first formulated in [6] as Lemma 1.6.3 but with a
different and much more involved proof.
Lemma 2.7. Let A(X) be an arithmetic formula and F (x) be an arbitrary
formula of L2. Let A(F ) be the formula that arises from A(X) by replacing
every subformula t ∈ X by F (t) (avoiding variable clashes, of course). Then
we have
BI ` ∀X A(X)→ A(F ) .
Proof. Arguing in BI suppose that ¬A(F ). Pick a countable coded
ω-model M of ACA0 containing all parameters from A and F such that
M |= ¬A(F ). Letting U = {n |M |= F (n)} we have ¬A(U) because A is an
arithmetic formula and M is absolute for such formulae on account of being
an ω-model. Thus we have shown
BI ` ¬A(F )→ ∃X ¬A(X)
from which the desired assertion follows. uunionsq
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Conversely, one easily shows that the scheme ∀X A(X) → A(F ) (where
A(X) is an arithmetic formula and F (x) is an arbitrary formula of L2) implies
bar induction and thus provides an equivalent formalization of the theory BI
over ACA0.
3. Inductive definitions in BI
Definition 3.1. Let A(x,X) be an arithmetic formula in which the variable
X occurs positively. Henceforth we shall convey this by writing A(x,X+).
Define
IA(u) :⇔ ∀X [∀x (A(x,X)→ x ∈ X)→ u ∈ X] . (1)
We write IA ⊆ F for ∀v (IA(v)→ F (v)), and F ⊆ IA for ∀v (F (v)→ IA(v)).
Lemma 3.2. The following are provable in BI for every X-positive arith-
metic formula A(x,X+) and arbitrary L2 formula F (u).
(i) ∀u (A(u, IA)→ u ∈ IA).
(ii) ∀x [A(x, F )→ F (x)]→ IA ⊆ F
(iii) ∀u (u ∈ IA → A(u, IA)).
Proof. (i): Assume A(u, IA) and ∀x (A(x,X) → x ∈ X). The latter
implies IA ⊆ X. Since A(u, IA) holds, and owing to the positive occurrence
of IA in the latter formula, we have A(u,X). Since X was arbitrary, we
conclude that IA(u).
(ii): Suppose IA(u). Then ∀X [∀x (A(x,X) → x ∈ X) → u ∈ X], and
hence, using Lemma 2.7, ∀x (A(x, F ) → F (x)) → F (u). Thus, assuming
∀x (A(x, F )→ F (x)), we have F (u).
(iii): Let F (v) :⇔ A(v, IA). By (i) we have F ⊆ IA. Assuming A(u, F ) it
therefore follows that A(u, IA) since F occurs positively in the former formula,
and hence F (u). Thus, in view of (ii), we get IA ⊆ F , confirming (iii). uunionsq
4. Recursion in a type-2 object
Using the apparatus of inductive definitions, we would like to formalize
in BI recursion in the type-2 object E : (N→ N)→ N with E(f) = n+ 1 if
f(n) = 0 and ∀i < n f(n) > 0 and E(f) = 0 if ∀n f(n) > 0.
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In the formalization we basically follow [9, VI.1.1]. We use some standard
coding of tuples of natural numbers. The code of the empty tuple is 〈〉 := 1,
and for any k > 0 and tuple (m0, . . . ,mk−1) let 〈m0, . . .mk−1〉 := pm0+10 · . . . ·
p
mk−1+1
k−1 , where pi denotes the i+ 1-th prime number.
Definition 4.1. Below Sb0 denotes the primitive recursive function from
[9, II.2.5] required for what is traditionally called the S-m-n theorem. Let
CompE be the smallest class such that for all k, n, p, r, and s, all i < k and
m = m0, . . . ,mk−1 in N,
(0) 〈〈0, k, 0, n〉,m, n〉 ∈ CompE;
〈〈0, k, 1, i〉,m,mi〉 ∈ CompE;
〈〈0, k, 2, i〉,m,mi + 1〉 ∈ CompE;
〈〈0, k + 3, 4〉, p, q, r, s,m, p〉 ∈ CompE if r = s;
〈〈0, k + 3, 4〉, p, q, r, s,m, q〉 ∈ CompE if r 6= s;
〈〈0, k + 2, 5〉, p, q,m, Sb0(p, q〉〉 ∈ CompE;
(1) for any k′, b, c0, . . . , ck′−1, q0, . . . , qk′−1 in N, if for all i < k′
〈ci,m, qi〉 ∈ CompE and 〈b, q0, . . . , qk′−1, n〉 ∈ CompE, then
〈〈1, k, b, c0, . . . , ck′−1〉,m, n〉 ∈ CompE ;
(2) for any b ∈ N, if 〈b,m, n〉 ∈ CompE, then
〈〈2, k + 1〉, b,m, n〉 ∈ CompE .
(3.1) for any b ∈ N, if for all p ∈ N there exists kp ∈ N with kp > 0 and
〈b, p,m, kp〉 ∈ CompE, then
〈〈3, k, b〉,m, 0〉 ∈ CompE .
(3.2) for any b, p ∈ N, if 〈b, p,m, 0〉 ∈ CompE and for all i < p there exists
ki ∈ N with ki > 0 and 〈b, i,m, ki〉 ∈ CompE, then
〈〈3, k, b〉,m, p+ 1〉 ∈ CompE .
Clearly CompE is defined by a positive arithmetical inductive definition
that we denote by A
E
, i.e., CompE = IA
E
.
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Lemma 4.2. For all a,m ∈ N there is at most one n ∈ N such that
〈a,m, n〉 ∈ CompE.
Proof. Define a class X by
〈a,m, n〉 ∈ X iff 〈a,m, n〉 ∈ CompE and for all k ∈ N,
if 〈a,m, k〉 ∈ CompE, then n = k.
By Lemma 3.2 (ii) we only have to show that X is closed under the clauses
defining CompE. This is a straightforward affair, albeit a bit tedious. uunionsq
We shall put to use this notion of computability for a realizability inter-
pretation of CZF+LPO. This, however, will require that the computability
relation be a set rather than a class such as CompE. To achieve this we shall
invoke Theorem 2.4.
Lemma 4.3. BI proves that there exists a countable coded ω-model M of
ACA such that the following hold:
(i) M |= ∀x,y, z [〈x,y, z〉 ∈ CompE ↔ A
E
(〈x,y, z〉,CompE)].
(ii) M |= ∀x,y, z, z′[〈x,y, z〉 ∈ CompE ∧ 〈x,y, z′〉 ∈ CompE → z = z′].
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 4.2 using Theorem
2.4. uunionsq
We will fix a model M as in the previous lemma for the remainder of the
paper and shall write
{a}E(m) ' n ⇔ M |= 〈a,m, n〉 ∈ CompE .
Note that this notion of computability hinges on M. More computations
might converge in M than outside of M.
5. Emulating a type structure in BI
We would like to define a type-theoretic interpretation of CZF+RDC+
LPO in BI. This will in a sense be similar to Aczel’s interpretation of CZF
in Martin-Lo¨f type theory (cf. [1]). To this end, we initiate a simultaneous
positive inductive definition of a type U together with two binary relations
(of elementhood and non-elementhood) on it, and also of a type V of (codes
of) well-founded trees over U. The need for defining both elementhood and
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non-elementhood among members of U is necessitated by the requirement of
positivity of the inductive definition.
Below we use the pairing function (n,m) = (n+m)2 +n+1 and its inverses
()0, ()1 satisfying ((n,m))0 = n and ((n,m))1 = m. We will just write
(n,m) for (n,m).
Definition 5.1. Let nN := (0, n), nat := (1, 0), pl(n,m) := (2, (n,m)),
σ(n,m) := (3, (n,m)), pi(n,m) := (4, (n,m)), and sup(n,m) := (5, (n,m)).
We inductively define classes U,EL,NEL and V by the following clauses.
Rather than (n,m) ∈ EL and (n,m) ∈ NEL we write n ∈˙m and n /˙∈m,
respectively.
1. nN ∈ U; if k < n then k ∈˙nN; if k ≥ n then k /˙∈nN.
2. nat ∈ U and n ∈˙ nat for all n.
3. If n,m ∈ U, then pl(n,m) ∈ U.
4. Assume pl(n,m) ∈ U.
If k ∈˙n, then (0, k) ∈˙ pl(n,m). If k ∈˙m, then (1, k) ∈˙ pl(n,m).
If k /˙∈n, then (0, k) /˙∈ pl(n,m). If k /˙∈m, then (1, k) /˙∈ pl(n,m). If k is
neither of the form (0, x) nor (1, x) for some x, then k /˙∈ pl(n,m).
5. If n ∈ U and k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x ({e}E(k) ' x ∧ x ∈ U) holds for all k, then
σ(n, e) ∈ U.
6. Assume σ(n, e) ∈ U.
If k ∈˙n and ∃x ({e}E(k) ' x ∧ u ∈˙x), then (k, u) ∈˙σ(n, e).
If k /˙∈n or ∃x ({e}E(k) ' x ∧ u /˙∈x), then (k, u) /˙∈σ(n, e).
If x is not of the form (u, v) for some u, v, then x /˙∈σ(n, e).
7. If n ∈ U and k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x ({e}E(k) ' x ∧ x ∈ U) holds for all k, then
pi(n, e) ∈ U.
8. Assume pi(n, e) ∈ U.
If k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x, y ({e}E(k) ' x ∧ {d}E(k) ' y ∧ y ∈˙x) holds for all k,
then d ∈˙ pi(n, e).
If ∃u (u ∈˙n ∧ ∀z ¬{d}E(u) ' z), then d /˙∈ pi(n, e).
If ∃u∃x (u ∈˙n ∧ {e}E(u) ' x ∧ ∃z ({d}E(u) ' z ∧ z /˙∈x)), then
d /˙∈ pi(n, e).
9. If n ∈ U and k /˙∈n ∨ ∃x ({e}E(k) ' x ∧ x ∈ V) holds for all k, then
sup(n, e) ∈ V.
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Remark 5.2. Clearly, the predicates U, ∈˙ , /˙∈ and V all appear positively
in the above inductive definition. Moreover, it falls under the scope of arith-
metical inductive definitions and is therefore formalizable in our background
theory BI owing to Lemma 3.2. Note also that for this it was important to
move from the Π11 computability notion of Definition 4.1 to E-recursion in
the ω-model M.
∈˙ and /˙∈ are complementary in the following sense.
Lemma 5.3. For all n ∈ U,
∀x (x ∈˙n↔ ¬x /˙∈n) .
Proof. This can be proved by the induction principle of Lemma 3.2(ii).
uunionsq
Corollary 5.4. For each n ∈ U, {x | x ∈˙n} is a set.
Proof. Note that ∈˙ and /˙∈ are Π11 as they are given by positive arith-
metical inductive definitions. Since BI proves ∆11-comprehension by Corol-
lary 2.6, it follows from Lemma 5.3 that {x | x ∈˙n} is a set. uunionsq
Definition 5.5. We shall use lower case Greek letters α, β, γ, δ, . . . to range
over elements of V.
Using the induction principle from Lemma 3.2(ii), one readily shows that
every α ∈ V is of the form sup(n, e) with n ∈ U and ∀x ∈˙n {e}E(x) ∈ V,
where {e}E(x) ∈ V is an abbreviation for ∃y ({e}E(x) ' y ∧ y ∈ V).
If α = sup(n, e) we denote n by α¯ and e by α˜. For i ∈˙ α¯ we shall denote
by α˜i the unique x such that {α˜}E(i) ' x.
If ℘ is an r + 1-ary partial E-recursive function we denote by λx.℘(x,~a )
an index of the function x 7→ ℘(x,~a ) (say provided by the S-m-n theorem or
parameter theorem).
Lemma 5.6. There is a 2-ary partial E-recursive function =˙ such that
=˙(α, β) is defined for all α, β ∈ V and (writing in infix notation α=˙β for
=˙(α, β)) the following equation holds
(α=˙β) = (2)
σ(pi(α¯, λx.σ(β¯, λy.(α˜x=˙β˜y))), λz.pi(β¯, λy.σ(α¯, λx.(α˜x=˙β˜y)))) .
Moreover, (α=˙β) ∈ U holds for all α, β ∈ V.
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Proof. Such a function can be defined by the recursion theorem for
E-recursion (see [9, p. 261]), using (2) as the defining recursion equation.
Totality on V ×V follows from the induction principle for V. In the same
vein (2) yields =˙(α, β) ∈ U for all α, β ∈ V by employing the induction
principle for V. uunionsq
6. Realizability
We will introduce a realizability semantics for sentences of set theory with
parameters from V. Bounded set quantifiers will be treated as quantifiers
in their own right, i.e., bounded and unbounded quantifiers are treated as
syntactically different kinds of quantifiers. Let α, β ∈ V and e, f ∈ N. We
write ei,j for ((e)i)j.
Definition 6.1 (Kleene realizability over V). Below variables e, d range over
natural numbers. We define
e  α = β iff e ∈˙ (α=˙β)
e  α ∈ β iff (e)0 ∈˙ β¯ ∧ (e)1  α = β˜(e)0
e  φ ∧ ψ iff (e)0  φ ∧ (e)1  ψ
e  φ ∨ ψ iff [(e)0 = 0 ∧ (e)1  φ] ∨ [(e)0 = 1 ∧ (e)1  ψ]
e  ¬φ iff ∀d ¬d  φ
e  φ→ ψ iff ∀d [d  φ → {e}E(d)  ψ]
e  ∀x ∈ α φ(x) iff ∀i ∈˙ α¯ {e}E(i)  φ(α˜i)
e  ∃x ∈ α φ(x) iff (e)0 ∈˙ α¯ ∧ (e)1  φ(α˜(e)0)
e  ∀xφ(x) iff ∀α ∈ V {e}E(α)  φ(α)
e  ∃xφ(x) iff (e)0 ∈ V ∧ (e)1  φ((e)0).
Theorem 6.2. Let ϕ(v1, . . . , vr) be a formula of set theory with at most the
free variables exhibited. If
CZF + LPO + RDC ` ϕ(v1, . . . , vr)
then one can explicitly construct (an index of) a partial E-recursive function
f from that proof such that
BI ` ∀α1, . . . , αr ∈ V f(α1, . . . , αr)  ϕ(α1, . . . , αr).
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Proof. Realizability of the axioms of CZF+RDC is just a special case of
realizability over an ω-PCA+ as described in [14, Theorem 8.5] and is closely
related to Aczel’s [1] interpretation of CZF + RDC in type theory and the
realizability interpretations of CZF + RDC presented in [13, 15, 16]. Note
that to ensure realizability of ∆0 separation it is necessary that all types in
U correspond to sets (Corollary 5.4).
We shall thus only address the realizability of LPO. To avoid the niceties
involved in coding functions in set theory, we shall demonstrate realizability
of a more general type of statement which implies LPO on the basis of CZF:
(∗) (∀x ∈ ω)[P (x) ∨ R(x)]→ [(∃x ∈ ω)P (x) ∨ (∀x ∈ ω)R(x)].
To see that (∗) implies LPO assume that f ∈ 2N. Then let P (x) and R(x)
stand for f(x) = 1 and f(x) = 0, respectively.
Arguing in BI, we want to show that (∗) is realizable. The first step is to
single out the element of V that plays the role of the natural numbers in V.
By the recursion theorem for E-computability define a function g : N → N
with index d by {d}E(0) = sup(0N, λx.x) and
{d}E(n+ 1) = sup((n+ 1)N, d  n)
where d  n is an index of the function gn : N → N with gn(k) = {d}E(k) if
k ≤ n and gn(k) = 0 otherwise. Finally, let
ω = sup(nat, d).
Then ω ∈ V and ω realizably plays the role of the natural numbers in V.
Now assume that
e  (∀x ∈ ω)[P (x) ∨ R(x)]. (3)
Unraveling the definition of (3) we get (∀i ∈˙ ω¯){e}E(i)  P (ω˜i) ∨ R(ω˜i),
whence
(∀n ∈ N){e}E(n)  P (ω˜n) ∨ R(ω˜n). (4)
From (4) we get that for all n ∈ N,
[(f(n))0 = 0 ∧ (f(n))1  P (ω˜n)] (5)
∨ [(f(n))0 = 1 ∧ (f(n))1  R(ω˜n)],
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where f(n) = {e}E(n). There is an index b such that {b}E(n, x) = (f(n))0
for all n, x. If there exists n such that (f(n))0 = 0 then by clause (3.2)
of Definition 5.1 we get {〈3, 1, b〉}E(0) = n0 + 1 where n0 is the smallest
number such that (f(n0))0 = 0. Otherwise, by clause (3.1) of Definition 5.1,
we have {〈3, 1, b〉}E(0) = 0. We also find an index c such that {c}E(k) =
(n, (f(n))1) if k = n + 1 for some n and {c}E(k) = λx.(f(x))1 if k = 0
(where λx.(f(x))1 denotes an index of the mapping x 7→ (f(x))1 which can
be effectively computed from an index for f via the S-m-n theorem). Let sg
be the primitive recursive function with sg(n + 1) = 1 and sg(0) = 0. Then
we have
(sg({〈3, 1, b〉}E(0)), {c}E({〈3, 1, b〉}E(0)))  (∃x ∈ ω)P (x) ∨ (∀x ∈ ω)R(x).
Since there is an index b∗ such that
{b∗}E(e) ' (sg({〈3, 1, b〉}E(0)), {c}E({〈3, 1, b〉}E(0)))
this ensures the realizability of (∗). uunionsq
Acknowledgement:. This material is based upon work supported by the EP-
SRC of the UK through grants No. EP/G029520/1 and No. EP/G058024/1.
References
[1] P. Aczel: The type theoretic interpretation of constructive set the-
ory: Choice principles. In: A.S. Troelstra and D. van Dalen, ed-
itors, The L.E.J. Brouwer Centenary Symposium (North Holland,
Amsterdam, 1982) 1–40.
[2] P. Aczel, M. Rathjen: Notes on constructive set
theory, Technical Report 40, Institut Mittag-Leﬄer
(The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2001).
http://www.mittag-leffler.se/preprints/0001/, Preprint
No. 40.
[3] P. Aczel, M. Rathjen: Notes on constructive set theory,
Preprint (2010) 243 pages. http://www1.maths.leeds.ac.uk/ rath-
jen/book.pdf
[4] W. Buchholz and K. Schu¨tte: Proof Theory of Impredicative Sub-
systems of analysis (Bibliopolis, Naples, 1988).
13
[5] R.-M. Chen, M. Rathjen: Lifschitz Realizability for Intuitionistic
Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory. Archive for Mathematical Logic 51
(2012) 789–818.
[6] S. Feferman: Formal theories for transfinite iterations of generalized
inductive definitions and some subsystems of analysis. In: J. Myhill,
A. Kino, R.F. Vesley (eds.): Proof theory and Intuitionism (North
Holland, Amsterdam, 1970) 303–325.
[7] H. Friedman: Set-theoretic foundations of constructive analysis. An-
nals of Mathematics 105 (1977) 1–28.
[8] H. Gerber: Brouwer’s bar theorem and a system of ordinal nota-
tions. In: J. Myhill, A. Kino, R.F. Vesley (eds.): Proof theory and
Intuitionism (North Holland, Amsterdam, 1970) 327–338.
[9] P.G. Hinman: Recursion-theoretic hierarchies. (Springer,
Berlin,1978).
[10] W.A. Howard: A system of abstract constructive ordinals. Journal
of Symbolic Logic 37 (1972) 355-374.
[11] G. Kreisel: A survey of proof theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 33
(1968) 321–388.
[12] J. Myhill: Constructive set theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 40
(1975) 347–382.
[13] M. Rathjen: The strength of some Martin–Lo¨f type theories.
Archive for Mathematical Logic 33 (1994) 347–385.
[14] M. Rathjen: Constructive set theory and Brouwerian principles.
Journal of Universal Computer Science 11 (2005) 2008–2033.
[15] M. Rathjen: The formulae-as-classes interpretation of constructive
set theory. In: H. Schwichtenberg, K. Spies (eds.): Proof Technology
and Computation (IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2006) 279–322.
[16] M. Rathjen, S. Tupailo: Characterizing the interpretation of set
theory in Martin-Lo¨f type theory. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic
141 (2006) 442–471.
14
[17] M. Rathjen, A. Weiermann: Proof–theoretic investigations on
Kruskal’s theorem. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 60 (1993)
49–88.
[18] S.G. Simpson: Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic, second edi-
tion, (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
15
